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The Decline of Tenure: The Sixth Circuit's Interpretation of Academic Tenure's Substantive
Protections
John M. Badagliacca*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Academic tenure has played an instrumental role in shaping higher education in America
over the past century.

In the most basic sense, academic tenure provides job security to

employees in the academic field after a specified probationary period. 1 William Van Alstyne, an
American law professor, provides a helpful definition in his defense of tenure: "[t]enure,
accurately and unequivocally defined, lays no claim whatever to a guarantee of lifetime
employment. Rather, tenure provides only that no person continuously retained as a full-time
faculty member beyond a specified lengthy period of probationary service may thereafter be
dismissed without adequate cause. " 2

Van Alstyne's definition is important because it

emphasizes one of the crucial aspects of academic tenure---employee dismissal for "adequate
cause."3

Tenure provides both substantive and procedural protections to the tenured employee.
The substantive protections prevent unlawful dismissal, that is, dismissal without adequate cause,
while the procedural protections ensure that employers follow a certain process during the
employment and dismissal of tenured employees. Academic tenure also includes the concept of
"academic freedom," or the ability of professors to teach material in the way they see fit without
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thank Professor Charles Sullivan and my editor Chris Rojao for their helpful insights and edits on this Comment. I
also owe many thanks to Professor Lee Oser and Joseph Plukas for guiding me throughout college. Finally, I would
like to express my sincere gratitude to my family and friends for their support and encouragement throughout law
school and beyond.
1
CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 403 (1993).
2
William Van Alstyne, Tenure: A Summary, Explanation, and "Defense," 57 AAUP BULL 328 (1971) (emphasis in
original).
3
Throughout the history of academic tenure scholars, courts, lawyers, and others have used the term "adequate
cause" intermittently with "just cause" and "good cause." For this Comment, all three phrases mean the same thing:
the cause needed to properly dismiss a tenured professor.

worrying about the pressures of censorship or overt administrative restriction. This Comment
will analyze the rights provided by academic tenure, and discuss the history and the reasoning for
the adoption of academic tenure in American colleges and universities.
This Comment will discuss whether tenure, as an academic and legal concept, affords
professors specific rights outside of their employment contracts, or in the alternative, whether
tenure is an abstract concept that simply affords professors more freedom in their pedagogical
philosophies while providing no legal authority for continuous employment outside of their
employment contracts. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit chose the latter
in its interpretation of academic tenure in Branham v. Thomas M Cooley Law Schoo/. 4 Lynn
Branham was a tenured law professor at the Thomas M. Cooley Law School who was terminated
in December 2006. 5 The court ruled that Branham's tenure status did not afford her any specific
rights beyond those set forth in her employment contract. 6
This Comment argues that the concept of academic tenure in American higher education
today implicitly affords tenured professors procedural and substantive protections from
termination. These protections exist as tools to ensure that professors' academic freedom will
remain uninhibited after a probationary period in which the professors earn the right to their
protections. In Branham, the Sixth Circuit separated the job security aspect of academic tenure
from the academic freedom aspect, and treated tenure as a purely pedagogical concept. This
interpretation reduces tenure to an almost meaningless legal concept that affords no real
employment protections. The concepts of tenure as a grant of job security and tenure as a grant
of academic freedom are not mutually exclusive; they are interdependently linked. One cannot
exist without the other. This interdependent concept of tenure allows the educational system to
4

689 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2012).
!d. at 561.
6
!d. at 562.
5
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progress, and to divide this concept is to endanger the very system it was designed to protect.
For these reasons the Sixth Circuit erred in its interpretation of tenure.
This Comment will take an analytical approach to understand the meaning of academic
tenure and will serve as both a discussion of the legal interpretation of tenure and as a defense of
tenure in American higher education. Part II of this Comment will set forth the history of tenure
in American higher education. It will examine the evolution of tenure, the standards set forth by
academic and legal organizations, and the industry standards in American higher education. Part
III will discuss the Branham case and its holding.

Part IV will address the nationwide

implications of the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of tenure and set forth the argument that
Branham's tenure provided legal authority for her job security regardless of the one-year
duration of her most recent employment contract. It will also discuss the effect of the Branham
ruling on professors' future job security and on their ability to exercise academic freedom.
Finally, Part V will examine the contemporary opinions on tenure in American higher education
in relation to the Branham ruling.
II.

HISTORY OF TENURE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION

The history of specific legal protection for scholars can be traced back to twelfth-century
Europe. 7

In 1158, Emperor Frederick Barbarossa8 issued the Authentica Habita, an edict that

7

Walter P. Metzger, Academic Tenure in America: A Historical Essay, in FACULTY TENURE: A REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMISSION ON ACADEMIC TENURE IN HIGHER EDUCATION 93, 94 (1973) [hereinafter
Metzger, Academic Tenure in America].
8
Frederick I Barbarossa was a German-born Holy Roman Emperor who ruled from 1152-1190, and is widely
considered one of the most influential figures of his time. MEDIEVAL GERMANY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 380 (John M.
Jeep ed., 2001). Barbarossa's reign represented a highpoint of German power, and his influence on the German
people remained long after his death:
[The Empire's] territory had been wider under Charles, its strength perhaps greater under Henry
III; but it never appeared in such pervading vivid activity, never shone with such lustre of chivalry,
as under the prince whom his countrymen have taken to be one of their national heroes, and who is
still, as the mythic type of Teutonic character, honoured by picture and statue, in song and in
legend, through the breadth of the German lands. JAMES BRYCE, THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE 72
(1864).
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promised scholars safe passage in their travels, protection from attack upon their homes, and
compensation for unlawful injury. 9 This twelfth-century edict shows how even hundreds of years
ago western civilization understood the need to afford certain protections to those who pursued
scholarly work and who would in tum pass on their knowledge to the next generation. Special
protection for educators, however, did not become a part of the American educational system
until relatively recently.

Tenure did not reach American schools until the later half of the

nineteenth century, and the modem concept of academic tenure did not exist until the beginning
of the twentieth century. 10 The concept of tenure took time to develop in the United States, and
did not emerge as a fundamental doctrine of American education until the oldest institutions of
higher learning were forced to adapt to the progressive academic movement at the tum of the
twentieth century. 11

A.

Origins of Tenure in the United States
In early nineteenth-century America, colleges anchored themselves in tradition.

By

centering themselves in tradition, American colleges were paternalistic, authoritarian, and
extremely skeptical of youth. 12 Institutions of higher education focused on the importance of
Christianity, classical studies, and discipline. 13 This pedagogical mindset left very little room for
intellectual creativity. 14 At that time, professorial appointments usually lasted indefinitely and
continued as long as the professor exhibited good behavior. 15

Although these indefinite

appointments existed, there was no legal precedent to support the presumption that the professor

Barbarossa's edict undoubtedly influenced later German concepts regarding special protections for scholars and
academics. See infra text accompanying notes 21-27.
9

Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 94.

10

WALTER P. METZGER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE UNIVERSITY 4-5

(1955).

/d.
12 !d.
13 !d.
14 !d.
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RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE COLLEGE

4

230 (1955).

should be allowed to continue his employment absent adequate cause for dismissal. 16 As a
result, the professor could be fired at will in many institutions without any procedural
protections. 17 The courts, not wanting to get involved in universities' administrative decisions,
allowed university boards to govern themselves regarding faculty hiring and firing decisions. 18
All appointments were, in a legal sense, temporary and instantly extinguishable. 19 The norms
and standards regarding professorial employment also varied from school to school, and the
standards of any given university depended largely on its location and the people in charge. 20
While academic tenure as a legal concept was unclear and undefined in America during
the nineteenth century, the time marked the beginning of a cultural infusion that would reshape
American thoughts on academic freedom.
Americans studied in German universities. 21

In the nineteenth century over nine thousand
These returning students, along with German

scholars teaching in the United States at the time, assimilated German methods and ideals into
American higher education. 22 One of the most important ideals that Germans brought to the
United States was the concept of lehrfreiheit, which roughly translates to "teaching freedom,"
and encompasses what we now call "academic freedom." 23
Particularly, the concept of lehrfreiheit meant two things: (1) that a university professor
was free to perform his own research and to report his findings through publication or lecture;

16
17

Id
Id

18

Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 133.
James J. Fishman, Tenure and Its Discontents: The Worst Form of Employment Relationship Save All of the
Others, 21 PACE L. REv. 159, 164 (2000).
20
Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 135.
21
METZGER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE UNIVERSITY, supra note 10, at 93.
22
!d. The German concept of giving professors and scholars specific protections traces all the way back to Emperor
Barbarossa's Authentica Habita. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying texts.
23
Gregory M. Dickinson, Academic Tenure and the Divide between Legal Academia and Legal Practice, 6
DARTMOUTH L.J. 318,329 (2008).
19

5

and (2) that the professor enjoyed the freedom of teaching and freedom of inquiry?4

The

Germans did not believe that adherence to lehrfreiheit was a voluntary choice for universities:
"[t]his freedom was not, as the Germans conceived it ... a superadded attraction of certain
universities and not of others; rather, it was the distinctive prerogative of the academic
profession, and the essential condition of all universities."25 Lehrfreiheit also promoted the
concept of limited administrative rules within the education system. 26 Therefore, the German
idea of academic freedom entailed the right of professors to teach without fear of dismissal, and
promoted an atmosphere of administrative leniency surrounding the teaching process? 7
By the second half of the nineteenth century, the professoriate began organizing into
specialized departments reflecting national specialist organizations. 28

This created a more

specialized faculty comprised of research scholars who could best be evaluated by their
disciplinary peers rather than by administrators or lay trustees. 29 After this shift, universities
were only a short step away from adopting the belief that faculty should be involved in a quasijudicial proceeding to determine whether another faculty member should be dismissed. 30 This
new specialized faculty brought with it a conflict between professors and administrators. 31 The
more the professors explored and critiqued their own specialized field--delving into
controversial topics and ideas-the angrier the administrators became. 32 The divergence of
traditional views in academia had previously been easy grounds for dismissal, but the turn-of24 METZGER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE UNIVERSITY, supra note 10, at I 12-13.
25
Id at I 13.
26
27

Id
Id

28

Fishman, supra note 19, at 164. These organizations were tailored to specific disciplines. Id For example,
history professors became part of the newly formed American Historical Association. !d. The American professor
now belonged to a broad professional group (the faculty) and a narrower professional group within a specific
discipline. !d.
29
Dickinson, supra note 23, at 330.
3
Fishman, supra note 19, at 165.
31
Dickinson, supra note 23, at 330.

°

"Id
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the-century technological advances and the philosophical shifts of the era resulted in a different
outlook towards progressive academic thought. 33

It became apparent that to continue the

progressiOn of the era, institutions of higher learning needed to promote greater academic
freedom. 34

As the economy demanded highly trained scientists due to the technological

advances of the industrial revolution, universities sought out skilled specialists to provide their
students with the proper education. 35 In turn, these highly skilled professors demanded a great
level of academic autonomy in order to advance the sciences. 36

University leaders began

publicly embracing the protection of progressive academic thought at the beginning of the
twentieth century. 37 In the 1907 commencement address, Harvard president Charles W. Eliot
said:
[S]o long as ... boards of trustees of colleges and universities
claim the right to dismiss at pleasure all the officers of the
institutions in their charge, there will be no security for the
teachers' proper freedom . . . . [I]t is easy for a department to
become despotic, particularly if there be one dominant personage
in it. 38
Eliot's statement was one of the first to link academic freedom with the goal of avoiding
administrative interference with faculty positions. 39

At the time of Eliot's commencement

address, the American university was uprooting itself from its authoritarian past, allowing an
opportunity for the modern tenure system to take hold. 40

B.

TheAAUP

33

Id at 331.
Id
35
Id
36 Id
37
See, e.g., METZGER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE UNIVERSITY, supra note 10, at 124.
38 !d.
39
Dickinson, supra note 23, at 331.
40
This tenure movement gained momentum in the early twentieth century, but still took time to develop: in 1913 a
Wesleyan professor was dismissed for giving a speech in which he urged less rigid observance of the Sabbath. See
34

Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 146.
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In 1900, Stanford University dismissed economics professor Edward A. Ross from his
position due to his political and social views. 41 Jane Lathrop Stanford, the widow of Stanford
University's founder Leland Stanford, was the sole trustee of the university at the time. 42 Upon
hearing about Ross's views, Stanford dismissed him. 43 Arthur Oncken Lovejoy, an associate
professor at Stanford, resigned in protest of Ross's dismissal 44 In 1913 Lovejoy, along with
eighteen professors from Johns Hopkins University, wrote a letter to colleagues at other leading
universities asking them to join in the formation of a national association of professors. 45 The
purpose of the association was to protect the institutional interests of faculty, specifically through
the creation of general principles regarding tenure and the legitimate dismissal of faculty. 46
The Hopkins letter was well-received by professors around the country and the American
Association of University Professors (AAUP) was established in 1915. 47 The AAUP modeled
itself after the American Bar Association in order to promote its desire to serve as a link between
professionalism and academic freedom. 48 In the same year of its establishment, the AAUP
issued the 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure. 49 The
report championed three elements of academic freedom: "freedom of inquiry and research,
freedom of teaching within the university or college, and freedom of extramural utterance and
action." 50 In 1940, the AAUP, in coordination with the Association of American Colleges

41

Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 138.
Jd.
43 Jd.
44
Jd. at 135.
45 !d.
46
Fishman, supra note 19, at 166.
47
METZGER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE UNIVERSITY, supra note 10, at 194.
48
Fishman, supra note 19, at 167.
49
See General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, I AAUP BULL. 291 (1915),
available
at
http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/A6520A9D-OA9A-47B3-B550C006B5B224E7/0/1915Declaration.pdf [hereinafter I 9 I 5 Declaration].
50
!d. at 292.
42

8

(AAC), released a new statement of principles. 5 1 The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic

Freedom and Tenure ("1940 Statement") received widespread endorsement and became one of
the most influential of all such formularies. 52
The 1940 Statement defined tenure as a means to two specific ends: "(!) freedom of
teaching and research and of extramural activities, and (2) a sufficient degree of economic
security to make the profession attractive to men and women of ability." 53 With the new goals of
tenure set forth, the AAUP then labeled freedom and economic security as "indispensible to the
success of an institution in fulfilling its obligations to its students and to society." 54 The 1940

Statement further demanded that, after a probationary period, teachers should have permanent or
continuous tenure. 55 After achieving tenure, the professor could not be terminated except for
adequate cause. 56 One of the shortcomings of the 1940 Statement was its failure to clearly define
adequate cause, providing only "an oblique reference to moral turpitude and a suggestion as to
how incompetence should be judged."57 The 1940 Statement also sets forth an early framework
for the procedural rights afforded to tenured professors: "[t]ermination for cause of a continuous
appointment, or the dismissal for cause of a teacher previous to the expiration of a term
appointment, should, if possible, be considered by both a faculty committee and the governing
board of the institution. " 58

51

Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 152; 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom

and Tenure, AAUP POLICY TENTH (2d ed.) 3, available at http://www.aaup.org/sites/defaultlfiles/principlesacademic-freedom-tenure.pdf [hereinafter 1940 Statement of Principles].
52

Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 152.

53

1940 Statement ofPrinciples, supra note 51, at 3.
!d.
55
!d. at 4.
56 !d.
57
Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 152 n.91.
58
1940 Statement of Principles, supra note 51, at 4.
54

9

In 1958, the AAUP and AAC collaborated again to release a more detailed and stringent
policy on the procedural standards for dismissals. 59 This new policy stated that when the first
reasons arise to question the fitness of a tenured faculty member, the administrative officer
should first seek a personal conference with the faculty member. 60 The faculty member may
then request a hearing in order to determine whether he should be removed from the faculty
position on the grounds stated. 61 The faculty member had the right to counsel, to question all
witnesses who testify orally, and to be confronted by all adverse witnesses. 62 In addition, there
must be a record of all of the evidence against the professor. 63
Since 1957, the AAUP has continuously released and revised a policy document titled

Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure ("Recommended
Regulations"). 64 The document reflects the development of AAUP standards and procedures,
and the most recent revision is from 2009. 65 The opening lines of the recommended regulations
state its purpose to "protect academic freedom and tenure and to ensure academic due process. "66
The Recommended Regulations specifically point out that dismissals of all forms of faculty
members will not be a means of curbing academic freedom: "[a]dequate cause for a dismissal
will be related, directly and substantially, to the fitness of faculty members in their professional
capacities as teachers or researchers. Dismissal will not be used to restrain faculty members in

59

1958 Statement on Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal Proceedings, AAUP POLICY TENTH (2d ed.) 12,
available at http://www.aaup.org/file/standards-faculty-dismissal.pdf [hereinafter I 958 Statement ofPrinciples].
60
Jd. at 13.
61 Jd.
62 !d.
63
!d. at 14.
64
Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure, (2009), available at
[hereinafter
http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/E45D703 B-OOF 1-4 BC0-9DOA-322DF63 A I DO? /0/RIR.pdf
Recommended Regulations].
65 !d.
66
!d. at I.
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their exercise of academic freedom or other rights of American citizens. " 67 The language of the

Recommended Regulations shows a conscious effort on the part of the AAUP to defend the idea
that tenured professors can maintain job security without fear of arbitrary dismissal. Almost one
hundred years after its inception, the AAUP still champions the protection of academic freedom
in American institutions, and reinforces that idea in its published works. 68
C.

The ABA
Law schools are a particularly prominent subset of American institutions of higher

learning. Like some other graduate schools, law schools have the special quality of being linked
to both the educational world and to the world of a specific and prominent profession.
Therefore, as members of educational institutions, law professors fall under the protection of the
standards and regulations of the AUUP. 69

But law professors, as members of the legal

profession, may also find guidance and protection under the standards and regulations of the
American Bar Association (ABA). 70 Every year, the ABA releases its Standards and Rules of

Procedure for Approval of Law Schools ("ABA Standards"). 71

The main purpose of the

publication is to set forth the requirements law schools must meet in order to obtain and retain
ABA approval. 72 ABA accreditation is important because in most states, one must have attended
an ABA accredited school in order to sit for the bar exam. 73

67

Attending an ABA accredited

/dat4.

68

See generally AM. Ass'N OF U. PROFESSORS, http://www.aaup.org (last visited Mar. 12 2013).
69 Id
70
See ABA, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROC. FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, vii (2012), available at
http://www .americaubar.org/content/darn/aba!publications/rnisc/legal_education/Standards/20 12_ 20 13 _ aba_ staudar
ds_ aud_rules.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].
71/d
72

/d
For more information on the ABA's accreditation and approval of law schools see FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS, http://www .americaubar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/frequently_asked_questions.html.
73
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school also ensures that the student will rece1ve a nationally approved program of legal
education. 74
The ABA Standards also set forth the standards and requirements that govern law school
faculty at ABA accredited institutions. 75 Standard 405, labeled Professional Environment, states
that "[a] law school shall have an established and announced policy with respect to academic
freedom and tenure of which Appendix I herein is an example but is not obligatory." 76 Standard
405 also includes a set of interpretations to explain the standard. 77 The explanation of tenure in
interpretation 405-6 bears a heavy resemblance to the concept of tenure maintained by the
AAUP: "[a]fter tenure is granted, the faculty member may be terminated only for good cause,
including termination or material modification of the entire clinical program." 78 Interpretation
405-6 also grants specific protections to professors with long-term contract agreements. 79 The
trend and popularity of long-term contracts for faculty members will be discussed in more detail
in Part IV infra.
As mentioned above, the ABA Standards provides an example of the tenure policies and
procedures that accredited law schools must adopt in their appendices. The example given by
the ABA, labeled Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure, is the exact text from the 1940

Statement issued by the AAUP. 80

The ABA's decision to adopt the AAUP's policies on

academic freedom and tenure as the template for law schools shows that the ABA acquiesced to
the AAUP's regulations in matters regarding academic tenure. 81 Although the ABA Standards

74

See id.
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 70.
76
!d. at 32.
77
!d. at33.
78
Compare ABA STANDARDS, supra note 70, at 33, with 1940 Statement of Principles, supra note 51, at 4.
79
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 70, at 33.
8
°Compare id. at 161, with 1940 Statement of Principles, supra note 51.
81
The ABA's Statement on Academic Freedom begins with a footnote mentioning that the text of the statement
follows the AAUP's 1940 Statement of Principles. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 70, at 161.
75
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states that it is not obligatory for law schools to adopt the example given, the ABA's choice to
use the 1940 Statement as its tenure policy template is clearly an endorsement of the AAUP's
policies. 82
D.

Current Tenure Statistics
The National Center for Education Statistics reported that in the fall of2010, 46% of full-

time professionals employed at post-secondary schools (including law schools and other
professional schools, but excluding medical schools) had faculty status. 83 The report further
states that 21% of all full-time professionals had tenure, meaning 45.6% of employees with
faculty status had tenure. 84 Another 17.4% of faculty employees were on a tenure track, while
only 15.2% of full-time faculty belonged to post-secondary schools without a tenure system. 85
This data shows that a vast majority of colleges and universities across the country utilize some
form of tenure system. In those schools, over half of the full time faculty members have tenure
status or are on a tenure track. Tenure is a major part of American education, and any change to
the substantive tenure doctrine will have serious implications for the institutions and professors
participating in some form of tenure system. 86

Thus, academic tenure's ability to ensure

academic freedom must be protected or else true academic freedom in American institutions of
higher learning will begin to disappear.
III.

THE BRANHAM DECISION

In August 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed
whether a professor's tenure status afforded her any specific rights outside of her current
82

83

Id

NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, EMPLOYEES IN POSTSECONDARY INSTITUTIONS, FALL 2010, AND
SALARIES
OF
FULL-TIME
INSTRUCTIONAL
STAFF,
2010-11,
at
3
(2011),
available
at

http://nces.ed.gov/pubs20 12/20 12276.pdf.
84 !d.
85
ld

,.,d

13

employment contract in Branham v. Thomas M Cooley Law School. 87

The Sixth Circuit

ultimately held that Branham's tenure status did not grant her any rights other than those
enumerated in her individual employment contract for the most recent year. 88 The ruling set a
precedent against the legal significance of tenure status and bolstered the importance of
employment contracts for graduate professors.
Thomas M. Cooley Law School hired Lynn Branham as a criminal law professor in
1983. 89 On December 21, 2005, Branham signed an employment contract for a twelve-month
employment period beginning on January 1, 2006. 90 Branham's employment contract contained
a section labeled "Rank and Title" which read: "The Professor shall hold the rank and title of
TENURED PROFESSOR OF LAW with all the rights and privileges thereof, as defined in the
Bylaws of the School or as may from time to time be conferred by the Board ofDirectors." 91 In
the section labeled "General Provisions," the employment contract expressly incorporated certain
ABA standards: "The current provisions of the American Bar Association standards governing
approval of law schools as they relate to maximum teaching loads and other rights, duties, and
prerogatives of faculty members shall be and become part of this contract by reference
thereto."92 Branham's employment contract also expressly incorporated Cooley's Policy 201the law school's policy regarding academic rank and tenure. 93
In the Spring Semester 2006, Branham taught Constitutional Law and Torts. 94 Branham
completed the semester without a problem although she expressed displeasure with the school

87

689 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 20 12). The Sixth Circuit subsequently denied a rehearing and a rehearing en bane. !d.
!d. at 563.
89
!d. at 561.
90 Id.
91
Emp't Contract at 12, Branham v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., No. 1:07-CV-630 (W.O. Mich. Mar. 16, 2009),
20 I 0 WL 3505930.
92
!d. at 15.
93
Branham, at 562; see infra text accompanying note 104.
94
!d. at 561.
88
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administration for not assigning her any criminal law-related courses. 95 In the Fall Semester
2006 she was again assigned to teach Constitutional Law, which she refused to teach. 96 Instead,
she requested an assignment to teach a course related to criminallaw. 97 In December 2006, after
Branham refused to teach her assigned course, Cooley dismissed Branham from her position. 98
Branham's employment contract required Cooley to put Branham's dismissal to a faculty vote
before the dismissal could be final. 99 Cooley failed to follow this procedure, and there was no
faculty vote concerning Branham's dismissal. 100
Upon her dismissal, Branham filed a complaint for wrongful dismissal for breach of
contract against Cooley in federal court. 101

The District Court for the Western District of

Michigan concluded that Cooley had breached the employment contract by not following the
dismissal process required by the contract. 102 The court then ordered Cooley to comply with that
process. 103 Cooley's Policy 201 states:
No tenured faculty member shall be dismissed . . . prior to the
expiration of the term of his appointment, except for good cause
shown and in accordance with the following procedure:
(a) Notice in writing by the dean of the reasons and grounds for
dismissal shall be served on the faculty member at least
fourteen days prior to a meeting of the faculty conference at
which the removal is to be considered, as provided in
subparagraph (b) herein.
(b) The Dean shall thereafter cause a meeting of the faculty
conference to be convened for the purpose of considering
removal of the faculty member.

95

Id
!d.
97
Id
98
Id
99
Branham, 689 F.3d at 561.
100 Id
96

101/d
102
103

Id
Id
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(c) If the faculty conference shall concur in removal, the faculty
member shall be removed, subject to appeal to the academic
committee of the Board of Directors. 104
In accordance with the court's decision, Cooley held a faculty conference to debate whether
adequate cause existed to dismiss Branham. 105 The faculty concurred with Cooley's decision to
dismiss Branham, and the district court then ruled that Cooley had complied with the procedural
requirements set forth in Branham's employment contract. 106 Although the district court found
that Cooley had originally violated the procedural requirements regarding Branham's dismissal,
the court went on to rule that the tenure granted under Branham's contract did not afford her
rights beyond those specified in her employment contract. 107 Branham appealed the district
court's decision, bringing the issue to the Sixth Circuit.
A.

The Sixth Circuit's Analysis in Branham

On appeal, Branham argued that her status as a tenured professor granted her a lifetime
appointment or a guarantee of continuous employment. 108 She believed that the court should
have incorporated the ABA's suggested tenure policies into her employment contract and used
those policies to interpret the rights and protections she had regarding her employment status.' 09
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis of the issue by examining Michigan contract law and
finding that "contacts for permanent employment are for an indefinite period of time and are
presumptively construed to provide employment at will." 110 Branham's contract was a twelve-

104

/d. at 563.
Branham, 689 F.3d at 561.
106
/d. After the district court ordered Cooley to conduct the faculty conference, the school issued Branham a written
notification of the reasons for her dismissal. /d. at 563. The faculty members at the conference voted 85-19 in
favor of Branham's dismissal. /d. The district court ruled that Cooley's actions satisfied the procedural
105

requirements for dismissal even though the faculty conference took place years after Branham's original dismissal.
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month employment contract. 111 Therefore, under Michigan contract law, Branham's contract
was not a contract for permanent employment unless a specific provision of the contract granted
her employment for an indefinite period of time outside of the twelve-month agreement. 112
Importantly, the court did not find that Branham's tenure status, which was expressly
incorporated into the contract, granted her indefinite employment. 113
The first step the Sixth Circuit took in its analysis was to define the exact rights
Branham's tenure status provided her as a professor at Cooley. 114 Due to the employment
contract's express incorporation of the ABA standards governing approval of law schools, the
court looked to ABA Standard 405 in order to interpret the scope of Branham's tenure rights.ns
Standard 405 states that "[a] law school shall have an established and announced policy with
respect to academic freedom and tenure .... " 116 The ABA provides a model tenure standard,
which, as mentioned in Part II supra, is the same standard as the model standard adopted by the
AAUP's 1940 Statement. 117 The Sixth Circuit reviewed the 1940 Statement but concluded that
since the ABA that articulated the statement "is an example but is not obligatory," the tenure
standard set forth by the statement was not necessarily the tenure that Branham heldll 8 The
court then took its analysis a step further and concluded that even if the tenure rights outlined in
the 1940 Statement were the exact rights incorporated into Branham's contract, the tenure held
by Branham still did not afford her any special rights beyond those enumerated in her contract. 119
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The court reached its conclusion due to a narrow reading of the 1940 Statement. The
1940 Statement reads "teachers ... should have permanent or continuous tenure," prompting the

court to find that it was merely a suggestion, and not a requirement, that law schools grant
·
. . m
. the contract express Iy
permanent or contmuous
tenure. 120 There fiore, absent any prov1s1on

defining Branham's tenure as permanent or continuous employment, the court found that the
language of the contract did not grant any form of permanent employment, and that Branham
only had a contract for a twelve-month period of employment. 121 The Sixth Circuit posited that
the tenure to which Branham's contract referred might have meant that she had academic
freedom, and that Cooley generally expected to enter into new employment contracts with her
each year, but that Branham was not guaranteed continuous employment through her tenure
status or her employment contract. 122 After the court completed its analysis of Branham's
substantive tenure rights it affirmed the district court's ruling that the court-ordered faculty
conference complied with the procedural rights afforded to Branham under her employment
contract. 123
B.

The Correct Analysis ofProfessors' Tenure Rights

The Sixth Circuit erred by ruling that Branham's tenure did not afford her rights beyond
those specified in her most recent employment contract. First, the court erroneously concluded
that only contracts for an indefinite period of time could establish permanent employment. 124
The court supported its reasoning by citing Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., which held that
contracts for permanent employment are for an indefinite period of time. 125
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Thus, since

Branham's contract was not for an indefinite period of time, Branham did not enjoy any right to
permanent employment. 126
The problem with the court's reliance on Rowe is that Rowe does not address the concept
of tenure. 127 The plaintiff in Rowe was a saleswoman, not a graduate professor with tenure
status. 128 The Rowe court did not need to address the issue of any additional employment rights
such as tenure. 129 Therefore, while the decision that contracts for permanent employment are for
an indefinite period of time remains good law, it fails to fully cover the issue of Branham's
substantive tenure rights. The concept of tenure that scholars have promoted throughout history
is that the tenured professor does not need to rely on contracts in order to maintain permanent
employment. 130 Tenure is the grant of a permanent employment status. If the only way to
ensure a prolonged promise of employment is to enter into an employment contract for a
permanent or lengthy period, then the entire purpose of academic tenure becomes moot. 131
Multiple courts have found that a professor's tenure status grants him employment rights
on top of his current employment contract, and that the rights expressly outlined in employment
contracts do not automatically limit or restrict substantive tenure rights. 132 For example, in
Collins v. Parsons College, the Supreme Court of Iowa ruled that a professor who was granted
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tenure in a one-year employment contract could be terminated only for just cause and on written
charges before the faculty. 133 Collins had signed a one-year contract, which labeled him as a
tenured professor even though the contract did not expressly define tenure. 134 Upon expiration
of the contract term, the college informed Collins that he would not be employed the following
year. 135 The college did not allege any adequate cause for its dismissal of Collins or make any
suggestion that Collins's dismissal was due to his performance. 136 The court ruled that Collins
"did not waive his right of tenure by executing written contracts carrying out the original
agreement in individual years." 137 Therefore, although Collins entered into an employment
contract for a period of only one year, he was still entitled to indefinite employment due to his
tenure status. 138 Additionally, the Collins court was willing to look to the general meaning of
tenure in order to define what Collins's tenure status entitled him, but did not need to resort to
that analysis because the school's tenure policies were clearly outlined in its bylaws. 139
The Supreme Court of Nevada encountered a similar tenure issue in State ex rel.

Richardson v. Board of Regents of University of Nevada. 140 There, the court found that the
university's bylaws regarding tenure were binding even if they were not enumerated in the
professor's individual employment contract. 141

Frank Richardson had been an associ ale

professor at the University of Nevada for four years when he was dismissed because of alleged
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insubordination. 142 The university's tenure policy was outlined in a faculty bulletin promulgated
by the Board of Regents, which stated that upon an associate professor's completion of one year
of service he could be re-appointed, after which re-appointment "his employment shall continue
under tenure." 143 The bulletin went on to state that a tenured professor may only be dismissed
for cause. 144 The court makes no mention as to whether the university expressly incorporated the
tenure policy or Richardson's tenure status in any of the employment contracts Richardson
signed with the university. 145 Regardless, when the Board of Regents was challenged on its
jurisdiction regarding Richardson's dismissal, the board argued that its tenure policy was not
binding and could be ignored whenever the Board saw fit. 146
The Supreme Court of Nevada ruled that the policy was binding, and stated that the rule,
"having been duly established, has the force and effect of statute," and that it affected all
"persons holding their positions under contract." 147

The University of Nevada had a clear

statement of its tenure policies, which its Board of Regents endorsed. 148 Therefore, regardless of
the rights set forth in its employees' contracts, the university had a binding obligation to obey its
tenure policy, which provided continuous employment to tenured professors. 149
The issue of the scope of tenure rights outside of the express content of employment
contracts is not limited to cases where the schools terminated the tenured professor.

The

Supreme Court of Montana ruled on a tenure issue that did not involve termination in Keiser v.
State Board of Regents of Higher Education. 150 Marjorie Keiser was the Director of the School
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of Home Economics at Montana State University. 151 In 1975, Keiser signed a full academic term
(twelve-month) employment contract, which stated that she had "continuous" tenure status. 152
Then, in 1978, the president of the university only offered Keiser a partial academic term (tenmonth) employment contract. 153 All of Keiser's employment contracts had termination clauses
stating that the school could only terminate a faculty member with continuous tenure if there was
"adequate cause." 154 But "continuous tenure" was not defined in any of Keiser's contracts. 155
The court looked to the 1940 Statement issued by the AAUP in order to define tenure and
determined that the goals of tenure were academic freedom and economic security, or the
promise of indefinite employment. 156 Since economic security was a goal of tenure, the court
ruled that Keiser and Montana State University had that goal in mind when executing Keiser's
1975 employment contract, and it ruled that a main ingredient of Keiser's continuous tenure was
appointment of a full academic term. 157 Therefore, the court found that the reduction in Keiser's
academic term was a violation of her continuous tenure. 158 Keiser's right to continuous full-term
employment was not expressly enumerated in any of her employment contracts, but the court in
Keiser looked outside the contracts to define the scope of Keiser's tenure rights and ultimately

ruled that her tenure status-undefined in all of her contracts-afforded her a specific set of
protections. 159
C.

The Correct Interpretation ofBranham's Tenure Rights

151

!d. at 195.
Id at 196.
153
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The Sixth Circuit's ruling in Branham stands in direct contradiction with the ruling in
Collins. Like Collins, Branham was a tenured professor, which was expressly stated in her

employment contract. 160

Branham also signed a contract that covered a one-year term of

employment. 161 The Sixth Circuit should have followed the reasoning of the Supreme Court of
Iowa in Collins-ruling that while the employment contract only covered a one-year term, the
professor's tenure status afforded him continuous employment unless adequate cause existed for
dismissal. 162
The main difference between Collins and Branham is that in Branham the law school
most likely had adequate cause to dismiss Branham-her refusal to teach her assigned classes. 163
But the fact that Cooley had adequate cause to dismiss Branham does not mitigate the error in
the court's analysis. The court ruled that Branham's tenure status was meaningless beyond the
agreements set forth in her employment contract, meaning that, even if Cooley lacked adequate
cause, it had the ability to dismiss Branham free of legal consequence at the expiration of her
one-year employment contract. 164 That is the exact situation that academic tenure is supposed to
prevent.
In Richardson, the university most likely had adequate cause to dismiss the professor
because of insubordination, but the university tried to skirt its own tenure policies, and the court
ruled that the policies were binding regardless of the professor's contract. 165 In Keiser, the
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professor's tenure status prevented the university from reducing her academic term at the
. .
exp1ratwn
of her emp1oyment contract. 166

The scope of the protection that tenure affords

professors is the core issue at stake in Branham, not the outcome of the professor's employment.
Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit reached the correct outcome: Branham's dismissal was proper. 167
But the court used a flawed rationale in order to reach that outcome, and the ruling that emerged
as a result of the court's flawed reasoning struck a harsh blow to the doctrine of academic tenure.
The Branham case is a prime example of a situation where administrative inefficiency
forced the court to enter into an unnecessary analysis, which resulted in an errant legal ruling.
Branham's employment contract granted her tenure status but did not define tenure. 168 The
contract then incorporated the ABA Standards, which provide that "a law school shall have an
established and announced policy with respect to academic freedom and tenure." 169 At that point
the contract still did not give any definition or explanation as to what Cooley's tenure status
actually meant. 170 The courts in Collins and Richardson did not have to face this issue.l7l In

Collins, the court noted that it was unnecessary to delve into a discussion on the meaning of
tenure because the faculty bylaws at Parsons College specifically stated that a tenured faculty
member "could be terminated only for just cause, on written charges before the tenured
faculty." 172 In Richardson, the court went as far as to rule that the university's tenure policy had
the force of a statute because there was a faculty bulletin, which expressly stated that upon
reappointment after one year, an associate professor's employment "shall continue under

166

Keiser v. State Bd. of Regents of Higher Educ., 630 P.2d 194, 199 (Mont. 1981).
Branham, 689 F.3d at 566.
168
I d. at 562.
169
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 70, at 32.
170
See Employment Contract, supra note 91, at 15.
l7l See generally Branham, 689 F.3d 558; Collins v. Parsons Coli., 203 N.W.2d 594 (Iowa 1973).
172
Collins, 203 N. W.2d at 597-98.
167

24

tenure." 173 The tenure policies of both institutions clearly provided that tenured professors have
the right to continuous employment because of their tenure status. 174 Collins and Richardson are
examples of administrative efficiency.
The Michigan Court of Appeals illustrated the best example of how administrative
efficiency can help solve problems by defining tenure in Bruno v. Detroit Institute of

Technology. 175 In that case, the school dismissed a professor without adequate cause, prompting
the professor to argue that his dismissal was improper due to his tenure status. 176 The court
stated, "the answer to this question depends entirely upon the construction given to the language
of ... defendant's tenure policy." 177 After looking to the school's policy, the court found that
the professor had achieved tenure status, and then sought to determine what that status meant. 178
The school's tenure policy defined tenure as "expectation of continuous appointment until
retirement, with stipulations that it may be terminated for causes specifically identified in the
present statement of tenure policy." 179 Here, the court looked to the school's policies, found the
policy on tenure, and made a ruling based on that policy. 180 The Sixth Circuit was unable to
perform an easy and straightforward analysis like the one in Bruno because Cooley's tenure
policy was not clearly defined. 181
The administrative inefficiency found in the Branham case-specifically, the lack of a
clear definition of tenure in Branham's employment contract or Cooley's school policiesforced the Sixth Circuit to devise its own interpretation of the scope of Branham's tenure rights.
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Since Branham's contract expressly incorporated the standards of the ABA, the court looked at
the ABA's model set of tenure policies-a direct copy of the AAUP's 1940 Statement. 182 The

1940 Statement defines tenure as a means for economic security and states that professors
"should have permanent or continuous tenure, and their service should be terminated only for
adequate cause." 183 Despite the 1940 Statement, the court rejected the argument that Cooley
adopted the ABA's model tenure policy because it found that the policy was merely an example
for schools and not an obligation that they must follow. 184
The court then admitted that Cooley's Policy 201 referred to the concept of tenure, but
did not define it. 185 The lack of a clear definition of tenure in the employment contract or in
Cooley's policies forced the court to analyze multiple tenure policies set forth by different
organizations, and the court failed to choose the correct standard that applied to Branham.
Instead, the Sixth Circuit decided that the ABA/AAUP policy did not apply-reasoning that the
policy was merely a model of a tenure policy, and did not necessarily represent the tenure
Branham held. 186 Thus, no right to continuous employment existed because there was no right to
continuous employment in the employment contract. 187

The Sixth Circuit further erred by

claiming that, even if it incorporated the 1940 Statement into the employment contract, Branham
would still not have been afforded any rights other than those explicitly laid out in her
contract. 188 The court reached this conclusion by claiming that the statement suggests but does
not require that law schools grant permanent or continuous tenure. 189 In Collins, Richardson,
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and Keiser, the courts treated "tenure" and "continuous tenure" as synonymous terms. 190 Tenure
is continuous; there is no such thing as non-continuous tenure. Therefore, the problem with the
Sixth Circuit's reasoning is that Cooley had already granted Branham tenure. Thus, by granting
Branham "tenure," Cooley granted Branham "continuous tenure," and the issue as to whether the
school was obligated to grant continuous tenure or not disappears.
In order for the Sixth Circuit to correctly interpret the scope of the protections afforded to
Branham by her tenure status, the court should have accepted the definition of tenure in the 1940
Statement as the definition of Branham's tenure.

The court should have accepted the 1940

Statement definition because no other clear definition of tenure existed in the employment

contract or in Cooley's bylaws. 191 Thereafter, the court should have read the 1940 Statement as a
policy that granted any tenured professor permanent or continuous employment because the 1940
Statement defined tenure as a means for economic security and outlined the substantive and

procedural rights of tenured professors. 192
The court should have held that, while the employment contract was a method for the
school to set up a contract for payment to the professor, the professor's tenure ultimately
controlled her employment status. In a contractual sense, the court should have viewed tenure as
a type of option-where the school is bound to employ the tenured professor if she decides to
come back year after year unless there is adequate cause for termination, but where the professor
is free to leave after any year without any binding obligation to the school. As long as the
professor has achieved tenure status, defined in the school's bylaws, the designated length of the
professor's most recent employment contract should not govern the length of time that the school
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remains obligated to employ the professor. In this case, Branham's tenure status did afford her
certain rights and protections not specified in her most recent employment contract, such as the
right to continuous employment. 193
IV.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BRANHAM DECISION

The Sixth Circuit's ruling in Branham will have adverse effects on the American
professoriate and American education.

The first problem for American professors is the

interpretation of academic tenure. By ruling that a professor's tenure status does not afford that
professor any rights or protections other than those specified in the professor's individual
employment contract, the Sixth Circuit diminished the role of academic tenure. 194 As much as
American higher education has changed in the past one hundred years, the main goal of tenure
has remained the same: to protect academic freedom. This goal is still important and necessary.
Any diminishment in the substantive rights afforded to professors with tenure status will result in
a diminishment of the protection of academic freedom in American institutions of higher
learning.

Branham allows colleges and universities discretion to grant professors "tenure"

without also granting them the rights and protections that traditionally accompany tenure. 195
Following the Branham decision, institutions will be able to please professors by granting them
"tenure" while circumventing the protections that should accompany the professors' tenure status
by: (I) not defining any specific tenure rights in professors' employment contracts and (2)
having a vague tenure policy that allows for a broad interpretation of whether tenure actually
means continuous employment or not. Cooley managed to achieve just this in Branham. If this
ruling stands, the protections of academic tenure will wane, as employment security for
193
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professors will only exist in their current employment contracts.

Essentially, "tenure" will

become a hollow title, rendering it a meaningless badge of seniority.
The diminishment of academic freedom that will result from the destruction of the
traditional academic tenure doctrine will have the most adverse effect on American education
because professors will no longer have the continuous job security that allows them to introduce
innovative thought into the classroom without fear of dismissal. An educational system that
makes it difficult to penalize a speaker reinforces the speaker's academic freedom. 196
Meanwhile, a restraint on academic freedom leads to a restraint on progressive thought. 197
Tenure as job security and tenure as academic freedom are linked such that the latter cannot truly
exist without the former. The reason why tenure provides extra job security to professors is
because it provides a means to academic freedom. 198 The concept of lehrfreiheit will no longer
exist in American education if school administrations are not required to adhere to certain tenure
standards and can control all employment protection through the professor's employment
contract. Professors might revert to the traditional teaching styles for fear of losing their jobs if
they promote too much non-traditional thinking. 199 The suppression of creative thought that
spurred the creation of the AAUP will increase as the protections afforded by academic tenure
decrease. 200
The ruling m Branham will also incentivize professors to seek more contractual
protections instead of the previously guaranteed protections of tenure.

This will mean that

seasoned professors will constantly have their next contract agreement in mind when planning on
196
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what materials to teach and how to teach them, especially if schools choose to hire them using
one-year contracts.

Instead of teaching and researching in a comfortable and protected

enviromnent, professors will be pressured to prove their short-term worth. Tenure is a long-term
commitment that promotes long-term intellectual growth. The temporal restraints that come with
employment contracts will impede that intellectual growth.
One potential solution to the problem in Branham is for institutions to clearly define their
tenure policies in both their bylaws and employment contracts. The bylaws should expressly
state that the school has a tenure system (as required by the ABA), 201 and then elaborate on what
substantive and procedural protections tenure status gives tenured professors. 202 Professors'
employment contracts should also state that the professor is a tenured professor and expressly
incorporate the tenure policies of the school (which should be clear and unambiguous) in order to
eliminate any confusion as to what tenure means or the rights of the tenured professor.

If

institutions of higher learning take these steps, issues such as the one in Branham may never
reach judicial review. Cooley's unclear polices and employment contracts allowed the Sixth
Circuit to enter an unnecessary analysis on tenure. 203 The result of that analysis now threatens to
alter and restrict American tenure doctrine.
Cooley's administrators have already recognized the law school's victory as a gateway to
impose more restrictions on tenured faculty members. 204 In a statement released after the Sixth
Circuit's decision, James Robb, Cooley's Associate Dean for Development and Alumni
Relations, stated that, "[t]he Sixth Circuit's decision is very important to institutions of higher
201
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learning because it confirms that 'tenure' is a contractual concept which takes its meaning only
from the language of the particular employment contract and from nothing else. The word
'tenure' itself adds no gloss." 205 But nowhere in the AAUP regulations, the ABA regulations, or
the in the historical evolution of tenure in the United States has tenure been treated as primarily a
contractual concept. 206 It has been treated as exactly the opposite-a concept that lies outside the
restrictions of normal employment standards and security. 207 The judiciary needs to protect this
concept of tenure in order to ensure that academic freedom continues to thrive in American
··208
.
co II eges and umversi!ies.
Contrariwise, the Sixth Circuit's ruling weakens the economic

security provided by academic tenure and, in turn, endangers academic freedom.
V.

CONTEMPORARY THOUGHTS ON ACADEMIC TENURE

The use of the tenure-track system in American colleges and universities has its critics
and its supporters. The anti-tenure community fears that tenure provides too much job security
to professors and allows professors to slip into a pattern of mediocrity without fear of
dismissal. 209 The pro-tenure base shares the views of this Comment-that academic tenure
protects academic freedom, which promotes progressive and creative thought in the
classroom. 210 In recent years, the anti-tenure camp has gained some traction, and the Branham
decision will undoubtedly add to that momentum.
The ABA has also started showing some signs of moving away from its tenure policy. In
20 I 0 a special committee of the ABA proposed a revision to its guidelines on academic
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freedom.2ll In the revision, the committee proposed to remove Standard 405, which requires all
schools to establish a tenure policy? 12 The committee characterized the change in the standards
as a way to minimize "intrusive mandates" on schools seeking accreditation, and urged that
schools should still protect academic freedom. 213
country have vehemently opposed this proposal. 214

Many law school professors around the
The professors specifically oppose the

proposal because it came only a few weeks after multiple groups issued lengthy statements in
favor of preserving the existing protections. 215 As of the 2012-2013 ABA standards, there has
been no change to the ABA's tenure policy. 216
Apart from the ABA, an increasing belief exists among American colleges and
universities that that the education system would be better without tenure. 217 Many institutions
are moving towards hiring faculty members with long-term contracts instead of implementing a
tenure-track system. 218 In a survey by The Chronicle of Higher Education, less than a quarter of
college presidents preferred full-time tenured professors to faculty working under long-term or
annual contracts. 219

Proponents of long-term contracts for professors argue that tenure's

protections make it too difficult to get rid of incompetent faculty and can promote a culture of
complacency among tenured professors. 220 One critic of tenure has even posited that academic
tenure has lead to a dearth of practical legal training in law schools. 221
211
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Although there has been a movement to remove tenure from higher education, there are
still many defenders of the traditional concept of tenure. Law Professor William Van Alstyne
believes that tenure's function as a protection for academic freedom provides more benefit than
harm. 222 Van Alstyne states, "[a]n individual who is subject to termination without showing of
professional irresponsibility, irrespective of the long term of his service within his discipline,
will to that extent hesitate publicly to expose his own perspectives and take from all of us that
which we might more usefully confront and consider." 223 Therefore, at the risk of giving tenure
to professors who may become complacent, an institution may force its professors to withhold
progressive thought in the classroom? 24 The occasional "deadwood" scholar, who becomes
complacent but does not function so poorly as to warrant removal may exist, but this is the
exception not the rule. 225 Surveys show that tenured professors publish more, teach more, and
serve on more committees than untenured professors? 26 Tenured professors also tend to do a
large amount of research in their field, allowing them to educate their students on the latest
academic works and breakthroughs. 227

Additionally, when institutions enforce their tenure

policies properly, they will dismiss poor professors when there is adequate cause. 228
Contrary to what many tenure opponents believe, tenure is essential to prevent decline in
quality amongst the professoriate.
regarding job security. 229

Tenure promotes efficiency by diminishing uncertainty

Tenure also promotes what Henry Rosovsky labeled the "social
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contract" of tenure. 230 The "social contract" of tenure includes the assurance that one can work
without interference, that one belongs to a select company of educated men and women, and that
one can grow old without the fear of being pushed out of one's job. 231 This concept is what
creates a favorable climate for academic freedom. 232 Tenure also creates a business pattern
called hands-tying. 233

A university ties its hands so that it cannot renege just because the

appointment of a particular faculty member was not as fruitful as the administration expected.Z34
This promotes better selection methods and hiring efficiency by institutions of higher leaming. 235
In the long run, institutions should benefit from this method because smart, able scholars will
join those institutions due to the opportunity to teach at a high level with good job security. 236
Tenure provides its own protection from poor professors because as difficult as it is to remove a
tenured professor, it is just as difficult to become a tenured professor. Nationally about two
percent of tenured faculty members are dismissed each year. 237

Meanwhile, the average

probationary period for a professor at a four-year school is seven years. 238 This is a time of
evaluation, during which most schools can choose not to renew the professor's appointment, or
dismiss the professor without cause 239
The Sixth Circuit's ruling in Branham promotes the movement towards long-term
contract agreements for professors in place of tenure status. It offers legal support for the power
of the employment contract over the power of the generally accepted concept of academic
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tenure.

The problem with long-term contracts is that the protections that professors would

normally have under tenure will only exist during the term of the contract and will disappear at
the end of the term. This is exactly how the probationary period for tenure works now. The only
difference is that probationary professors receive short-term contracts instead of long-term
contracts. 240 At the end of a contract the professor loses the substantive and procedural rights
that would have been afforded to him for life if he was a tenured professor. Tenure's critics may
perceive the Branham ruling as a victory for American colleges and universities, and a loss for
the professoriate, but this is a loss for both sides because the positive aspects of academic tenure
far outweigh the negative.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The founders of academic tenure in American higher education created tenure in order to
ensure academic freedom. They felt the oppression of an antiquated, authoritarian educational
tradition that stifled progressive thought, and instilled fear in those who chanced to speak out
against it.

The first step to protect academic freedom was to offer job security to the

professoriate. The first step to the destruction of academic freedom will be to eliminate that job
security. The Branham court erred in its ruling because it ruled that Branham's tenure did not
afford her rights beyond those specified in her most recent employment contract. That ruling
offered a huge blow to the job security that tenure status afforded tenured professors. According
to the Sixth Circuit, the substantive protections of tenure no longer exist unless they are
specifically enumerated in each professor's current employment contract.

The proper

interpretation should have been that once Branham accepted her position as a tenured professor,
she was entitled to continuous employment notwithstanding her annual employment contracts.
Cooley may have been justified in dismissing Branham for adequate cause, but that does not
240
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change the validity of her tenure status regarding the specific rights enumerated in her most
recent employment contract.

This interpretation is important because it protects professors'

tenure status and protects the vital rights that tenured professors receive: continuous employment
and academic freedom. If left unchanged, the Branham decision will lead to the deterioration of
tenure and the deterioration of academic freedom. The Sixth Circuit's weakening of academic
tenure rights will result in the dissipation of tenure track systems in American institutions due to
the inability of tenure to serve its main purpose to the professors. Professors will seek long-term
contracts in order to ensure job stability, and true academic freedom-the ability to teach without
fear of dismissal for teaching style or innovative classroom material-will no longer exist. This
is a step in the wrong direction for American higher education. The effect that the Branham
decision is the gateway to the erosion of academic freedom and must be overturned.
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